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DISTINGUISHING CERTIFICATION FROM ABSTENTION
IN DIVERSITY CASES: POSTPONEMENT VERSUS
ABDICATION OF THE DUTY TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION
Deborah J. Challener∗
I. INTRODUCTION
When a federal court grants an abstention-based dismissal in a diversity
case, the court abdicates its strict duty to exercise its jurisdiction where that
jurisdiction has been properly invoked. Thus, a federal court may not dismiss
a case on abstention grounds unless it concludes that “exceptional
circumstances” require the dismissal. When a federal court grants an
abstention-based stay in a diversity case, however, the court does not violate
its jurisdictional duty. According to the Supreme Court, an abstention-based
stay is merely a postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction. Although the
Court has characterized an abstention-based stay as a delay rather than an
abdication of the jurisdictional exercise, the Court surprisingly has not
approved the liberal use of such stays. Instead, the Court has limited
abstention-based stays, like abstention-based dismissals, to exceptional
circumstances.
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In the certification context, unlike the abstention context, the Court has
never addressed whether a federal court violates its duty to exercise its
jurisdiction when it grants a certification-based stay in a diversity case.
Several scholars have argued, however, that indeed certification in diversity
cases constitutes an abdication of the jurisdictional duty.1 Likewise, many of
the federal circuit courts treat certification of unsettled questions of state law
in diversity cases as an abdication of jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, these
circuits restrict certification, like abstention, to exceptional circumstances.3
This Article argues that a federal court does not abdicate its duty to
exercise its jurisdiction when it certifies a question in a diversity case;
instead, the court merely postpones the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus,
federal courts need not limit certification in diversity cases to exceptional
circumstances. To substantiate this argument, Part II of this Article explains
the pertinent abstention doctrines and the extension of abstention principles
from suits for equitable relief to actions for damages. Part II also explains the
development of the Supreme Court’s distinction between abstention-based
dismissals and abstention-based stays. Part III briefly describes certification,
discusses the Supreme Court’s certification case law, and establishes that the
Court itself has distinguished certification from abstention. Part IV reviews
the federal circuits’ certification case law. This survey shows that several
circuits, without explanation, equate certification with abstention and
therefore require exceptional circumstances before they will certify.
Part V synthesizes Parts II, III and IV and demonstrates that certification
is distinguishable from abstention. Specifically, Part V contends that,
contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, abstention-based stays in
diversity cases result in the relinquishment of jurisdiction because they entail
a full round of litigation in a state court system and therefore require all or an
essential part of the suit to be litigated in a state forum. Consequently,
1. See, e.g., Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool
in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 728-31 (1969) (arguing that
certification constitutes “an abdication of the responsibility imposed by Congress to adjudicate
cases when federal jurisdiction has been properly been invoked”); Jonathan Remy Nash,
Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1672, 1676, 1729-40 (2003) (“[C]ertification is inconsistent with the statutory diversity
jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Congress to the extent that it improperly
allows state courts to hear cases that fall within the statutory grant.”); Geri J. Yonover, A
Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 312 (1994)
(arguing that certification results in “frustration of the constitutional grant of diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction to the federal courts”).
2. See infra Part IV.A.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
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abstention-based stays are the functional equivalent of abstention-based
dismissals. In contrast, certification-based stays in diversity cases actually
result in postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction because certification is
simply a device that assists courts in the adjudicatory process. Certification
allows a federal court, in effect, to research a question of state law and does
not require fact-finding or application of law to facts. Thus, because
certification does not involve the abdication of duty, it is distinguishable
from abstention. Federal courts therefore should not employ abstention
principles to restrict the use of certification.
Part VI briefly addresses several secondary factors that federal courts
sitting in diversity consider in deciding whether to certify. Part VI concludes
that at least some of these factors are highly relevant to the certification
decision, and so it is these aspects of certification—not the exceptional
circumstances requirement of abstention—to which the courts should turn
their focus.
II. ABSTENTION
When Congress enacted the jurisdictional statutes,4 it conferred upon the
federal courts a “strict duty” to adjudicate controversies where their
jurisdiction is properly invoked.5 This “duty” derives from the “undisputed
constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”); § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between – (1) citizens of different States . . . .”); § 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise
expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
5. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996); see also Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (stating that federal
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them”);
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) (referring to the “duty
of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it”); Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) (“The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit
of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to afford to
suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather
than in the state courts.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given.”).
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scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds.”6
Nevertheless, the federal courts’ obligation to decide cases is not “absolute.”7
The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts have the power to
abstain.8 When a federal court abstains, it either: (1) declines to exercise its
jurisdiction altogether by remanding a removed case to state court or
dismissing the case outright,9 or (2) “postpones” the exercise of its
jurisdiction by staying the federal proceedings and remitting the parties to a
state trial court to start a new lawsuit in order to resolve an unsettled question
of state law.10 Given the courts’ rigorous duty, however, the power to abstain
is limited to “exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to

6. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989)
(citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
7. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716.
8. See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814-17 (discussing the different categories of
abstention and citing many cases in which the Supreme Court has approved of abstention).
There is a longstanding debate in the abstention literature as to whether the Supreme Court has
validly held that federal courts have the power to abstain. Compare Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71,
114-15 (1984) (arguing that abstention violates separation of powers principles), with David
L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574, 588 (1985) (arguing that
abstention “does not endanger, but rather protects, the principle of separation of powers” and
“that the responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and should carry with
it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal
jurisdiction”). See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (“[T]he boundaries of
federal jurisdiction – and the authority to define that jurisdiction – evolve through a dialogic
process of congressional enactment and judicial response.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction
and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004) (discussing the themes set
forth in David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985)). This
Article does not purport to enter this particular debate. Instead, this Article assumes, based on
Supreme Court precedent, that federal courts have the authority to abstain in certain
circumstances.
9. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (affirming a district court’s
dismissal of a complaint on abstention grounds); see also Meredith, 320 U.S. at 235 (citing
numerous examples of abstention-based dismissals).
10. See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1959)
(affirming a district court’s stay of proceedings on abstention grounds); id. at 27-28
(discussing abstention-based stays); see also Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-Jurisdictional
Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 344, 346 (1963) (“When a federal court abstains, the litigants bring a separate action,
often for declaratory judgment, in the appropriate state court. . . . Since the ultimate purpose of
abstention is to secure an authoritative determination of state law, the litigants must then
proceed to the final appellate court through the required tiers of the state judiciary. . . .”
(footnote omitted)).

2007] DISTINGUISHING CERTIFICATION FROM ABSTENTION

851

repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest.”11
A. Abstention and Suits for Equitable Relief
The Court has “located the power to abstain in the historic discretion
exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in equity’” to decline to exercise their
jurisdiction.12 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court initially applied
abstention principles to suits for equitable relief. In these cases, the Court
balanced the federal duty to decide cases against the state interests involved.
The Court approved of abstention only where it found that principles of
federal-state comity dictated that all or part of the dispute should be resolved
in a state court.
For example, in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,13 the
Court ruled that the district court should have abstained in a federal
constitutional case involving the interpretation of an ambiguous state
statute.14 In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered that all
sleeping cars on trains must be operated by Pullman conductors.15 At that
time, all of the conductors were white.16 The Pullman Company and the
affected railroads sued in federal court to enjoin the Commission’s order.17
The Pullman porters, who were all black, intervened in the suit as plaintiffs.18

11. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)); see also Quackenbush, 517
U.S. at 716 (“[F]ederal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise
‘exceptional circumstances,’ where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest . . . .”); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
188-89 (1959) (“The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to
exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception
to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest.”).
12. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718; see also id. at 717 (“[I]t has long been established
that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to
employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’ This tradition . . . explains the development of
our abstention doctrines.” (citation omitted)).
13. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
14. Id. at 501.
15. Id. at 497-98.
16. Id. at 497.
17. Id. at 498.
18. Id. at 497-98.
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The plaintiffs argued that the Commission’s order violated a Texas statute
and the United States Constitution.19
The Supreme Court found that under Texas law, it was unclear whether
the state statute at issue authorized the Commission’s order.20 Instead of
interpreting Texas law itself, the Court remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to stay the federal proceedings and remit the parties to state
court to obtain an authoritative interpretation of Texas law from the Texas
courts.21 The Court based its decision on “important considerations of policy
in the administration of federal equity jurisdiction.”22 The Court reasoned
that if the state courts found that the Commission violated state law by
issuing its order, the litigation would end.23 Thus, by sending the parties to
state court, the federal court would have avoided adjudicating a “substantial
constitutional issue” that “touch[ed] a sensitive area of social policy” or
issuing an injunction against the order of a state agency.24 On the other hand,
if the state court found that the Commission’s order violated state law, the
parties could return to federal court for adjudication of the constitutional
issues.25 The district court would no longer be faced with issuing a
“premature constitutional” ruling based on unclear state law, but instead
could issue a decision that would not later be mooted by a state court’s
interpretation of the statute.26
According to the Court, abstention under the circumstances in Pullman
demonstrated “‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state
governments’ and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.”27 Thus,
the court’s use of its equitable discretion to stay the federal constitutional
litigation and obtain clarification of state law “further[ed] the harmonious
relation between state and federal authority.”28

19. Id. at 498.
20. Id. at 498-99.
21. Id. at 501-02.
22. Id. at 501.
23. Id. at 498, 501.
24. Id. at 498.
25. Id. at 501.
26. Id. at 499-500 (“The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a
federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of
equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as
the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.”).
27. Id. at 501 (quoting Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass’n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935)).
28. Id.
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Similarly, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,29 a case decided two years after
Pullman, the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s decision to abstain
based on considerations of federal-state comity. In Burford, the Texas
Railroad Commission issued a permit to G.E. Burford to drill four oil wells.30
Sun Oil Company and The Magnolia Petroleum Company then sued the
Railroad Commission, Burford and another oil company in federal district
court, seeking cancellation of the permit or, in the alternative, an injunction
to prevent operation of the wells.31 The “principal issue” was whether the
Commission’s order was reasonable.32 Texas had developed a “complex
administrative system”33 to address such claims, and thus had “demonstrated
[an] interest in maintaining uniform review of the Commission’s orders.”34
Nevertheless, “the federal courts had, in the years preceding Burford,
become increasingly involved in reviewing the reasonableness of the
Commission’s orders.”35
The district court held that the suit should be brought in a state forum
and dismissed the case.36 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the
district court had properly declined to exercise its jurisdiction and affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.37 The Court identified a
number of “unique” grounds that favored dismissal38 and reasoned that
dismissal “was appropriate because the availability of an alternative, federal
forum threatened to frustrate the purpose of the complex administrative
system that Texas had established” to adjudicate the type of claims at issue in

29. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
30. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941), rev’d, 319 U.S. 315
(1943).
31. Id.
32. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (citing Burford, 319
U.S. at 317).
33. Id. at 725 (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332).
34. Id. at 724.
35. Id.
36. Sun Oil Co., 124 F.2d at 468.
37. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
38. In Quackenbush, a case decided fifty-three years after Burford, the Court explained
that it “approved the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint [in Burford] on a number of
grounds that were unique to that case,” including: (1) “the difficulty of the regulatory issues
presented”; (2) “the demonstrated need for uniform regulation in the area”; and (3) “[m]ost
importantly . . . the detrimental impact of ongoing federal court review of the Commission’s
orders, which . . . had already led to contradictory adjudications by the state and federal
courts.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 725.
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Burford.39 Thus, as in Pullman, the Court found that “a sound respect for the
independence of state action require[d] the federal equity court to stay its
hand.”40
In contrast to its decisions in Pullman and Burford, in Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven,41 the Supreme Court held that an appellate court improperly
exercised its discretion to abstain. The plaintiffs in Meredith owned bonds
that had been issued and were redeemable by the City of Winter Haven,
Florida.42 They brought suit in federal district court, seeking both declaratory
and injunctive relief, to prevent the City from redeeming the bonds without
paying interest.43 The court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship, and the only issues in the case involved the proper interpretation
of Florida law.44
The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action under Florida law and dismissed the complaint.45 The court of appeals
concluded that the applicable Florida constitutional and statutory law was
uncertain and therefore ordered that the case be dismissed without prejudice
so that the plaintiffs could proceed in state court.46 The Supreme Court
framed the question before it as whether the appellate court “rightly declined
to exercise its jurisdiction” because the case turned on unclear Florida law.47
The Court concluded that the dismissal was improper, reversed the judgment
of the appellate court, and remanded the case.48
The Meredith Court opined that, given the federal courts’ strict duty to
exercise their jurisdiction, they cannot decline to do so “merely because the
answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet
been given by the highest court of the state.”49 Thus, the Meredith Court held
39. Id. at 725 (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332). In Burford, the plaintiffs invoked
federal jurisdiction on both diversity and federal question grounds. 319 U.S. at 317. In
addition to their state law claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the Commission’s order violated
the U.S. Constitution. Id. Thus, the dismissal in Burford “had the effect of avoiding a federal
constitutional issue.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
815 n.21 (1976). Nevertheless, the presence of the federal question in Burford, “was not an
additional ground for abstention.” Id.
40. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
41. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
42. Id. at 229-30.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 229.
45. Id. at 230.
46. Id. at 230-31.
47. Id. at 229.
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id. at 234-35.

2007] DISTINGUISHING CERTIFICATION FROM ABSTENTION

855

that unlike the prior cases in which it had approved abstention, there were no
exceptional circumstances present in the case at bar that justified an
abstention-based dismissal.50 In contrast to Pullman and Burford, Meredith
did not involve a federal constitutional question that could be mooted by
remitting the parties to state court51 or “interference with [state] agencies or
with the state courts.”52 It simply involved uncertain Florida law regarding
the extent of the City’s liability on the bonds.
Moreover, the Meredith Court emphasized that the purpose of the
diversity statute is to give litigants “an opportunity . . . to assert their rights in
the federal rather than in the state courts.”53 The Court explained that to deny
the plaintiffs this option absent exceptional circumstances “would thwart the
purpose of the jurisdictional act,”54 further delay the litigation,55 and penalize
the plaintiffs without justification for invoking diversity jurisdiction.56
Finally, the Court recognized that while only Florida’s highest court could
“settle” the state law questions involved, the federal courts could at least
“adjudicate the rights of the parties” before them.57

50. Id. at 236.
51. Id. (citing R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
52. Id. at 237.
53. Id. at 234.
54. Id. at 235; see also id. at 237 (“We are pointed to no public policy or interest which
would be served by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which
Congress has created with the purpose that it should be availed of and exercised subject only
to such limitations as traditionally justify courts in declining to exercise the jurisdiction which
they possess.”).
55. Id. at 237.
56. Id. (“To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further the disposition of the
litigation which has been pending for more than two years and which is now ready for
decision. It is to penalize [plaintiffs] for resorting to a jurisdiction which they were entitled to
invoke, in the absence of any special circumstances which would warrant a refusal to exercise
it.”); see also County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1959) (“To
order [the plaintiffs] out of the federal court [absent exceptional circumstances] would
accomplish nothing except to require still another lawsuit, with added delay and expense for
all parties . . . . It exacts a severe penalty from citizens for their attempt to exercise rights of
access to the federal courts granted them by Congress to deny them ‘that promptness of
decision which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice.’” (quoting Forsyth v.
City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 (1897)).
57. Meredith, 320 U.S. at 238.
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B. Abstention and Actions for Damages
Although the Court first applied abstention principles to suits for
equitable relief, the court has not limited abstention to such suits.58 Instead,
the Court has permitted federal courts to abstain from exercising their
jurisdiction whenever they have discretion to grant or deny relief.59
Abstention principles consequently apply not only in suits for injunctive
relief, but also in declaratory judgment actions.60 Moreover, the Court has
further extended abstention principles to common law actions for damages.61
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,62 for example, the
City of Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed a petition in Louisiana state court
“asserting a taking of the [Power and Light Company’s] land, buildings, and
equipment.”63 The defendant removed the case to federal district court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship64 and sought compensation for the taking.65
A Louisiana statute appeared to permit the taking, but the statute had never
been interpreted by Louisiana courts.66 At the same time, the Attorney
General had issued an opinion in another “strikingly similar” case stating that
such acquisitions were prohibited.67 Given the uncertainty in Louisiana law,
the district judge stayed the proceedings until the Louisiana Supreme Court
had “been afforded an opportunity to interpret” the statute at issue.68 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court had properly exercised its discretion to stay the action “pending the
58. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 719. This Article uses the phrases “damages action,” “action for damages,”
and “actions at law” (as well as other variations of these phrases) interchangeably to refer to
actions seeking monetary relief as opposed to equitable relief. See Lewis Yelin, Burford
Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871, 1873 n.10 (1999) (“One
common way of distinguishing equitable actions from actions at law is that, in the former, the
court has discretion to adapt its relief to the circumstance of the case, while in the latter, the
relief afforded is normally money damages.”). Although this “distinction is too simple . . . [it
will] suffice for present purposes.” Id. (“This distinction is too simple . . . since relief in a
common-law action seeking issuance of a prerogative writ (such as mandamus or prohibition)
is discretionary.”).
62. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720.
66. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 26.
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institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana.”69 Thus, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
and reinstated the district court’s stay order.70
The Court first recognized that the case before it was an action “at law”
seeking damages and that its prior abstention cases were suits in equity.71
The Court stated, however, that its prior abstention cases “did not apply a
technical rule of equity procedure.”72 Instead, they were based on
considerations of federal-state comity.73 Thus, the Court explained, it
previously had approved abstention where it was necessary to avoid “serious
disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between
state and federal authorities.”74 The Court concluded that even though the
case at bar was a damages action, abstention was appropriate.75 It reasoned
that because the case involved eminent domain, a subject that is “intimately
involved with [a state’s] sovereign prerogative,”76 abstention was warranted
to maintain “harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the
political interests of a State.”77 Thus, the Court applied abstention principles
to an action for damages and reinstated the district court’s stay order.78
In upholding the district court’s order, the Court emphasized that the
lower court “had only stayed the federal case pending adjudication of the
dispute in state court,” rather than dismissing the suit as the Burford Court
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 28 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 28 (majority opinion).
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 29. As one commentator has explained, “The Supreme Court’s focus on
comity as the most essential component in the balance of federal/state interests for federal
abstention purposes has allowed [the] Court to expand the equitable doctrine of abstention to
cover actions seeking damages as well as those seeking equitable relief.” Stephanie Dest,
Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 278 (1989).
78. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30. In upholding the district court’s stay order, the Supreme
Court also recognized that the Louisiana state courts were “the only tribunal[s] empowered to
speak definitively” on the meaning of the eminent domain statute at issue. Id. at 29. The
district court could only “make a dubious and tentative forecast” as to the proper interpretation
of the statute. Id. Thus, if the federal courts interpreted and applied the statute in the case at
bar, then it “would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute [was] construed as [the
federal courts] would construe it, whereas the rights of all other litigants would be thereafter
governed by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana different from [the federal
courts’].” Id. at 30.
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had done.79 The Court explained that the district court would continue to
participate in the litigation because once the state court interpreted the
statute, the case would be returned to the district court.80 If the state courts
upheld the taking, then the district court would “award compensation.”81
Furthermore, if the parties did not file and obtain a declaratory judgment in a
timely fashion, then “the District Court, having retained complete control of
the litigation, [would] doubtless assert it to decide . . . the question of the
meaning of the state statute.”82
By stressing that the district court had merely stayed the proceedings, the
Thibodaux Court recognized the distinction between an abstention-based stay
and an abstention-based remand or dismissal.83 Traditionally, courts lacked
discretionary power to decline to exercise their jurisdiction in actions “at
law” except in very limited circumstances and therefore typically could not
dismiss common law damages actions.84 Thus, by analogy, an abstentionbased remand to state court in Thibodaux would have been improper because
the defendant sought compensation for the taking.85 According to the Court,
however, the stay in Thibodaux was acceptable because a stay, unlike a
dismissal, does “not constitute abnegation” by a federal court of its duty to
decide the case before it.86 Instead, a stay merely postpones the court’s
exercise of its duty to adjudicate the controversy until a later time.87 Thus,
while an abstention-based remand in Thibodaux would have represented an
inappropriate abdication of duty, the district court’s abstention-based stay

79. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996) (citing Thibodaux, 360
U.S. at 29).
80. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. Indeed, the Thibodaux Court distinguished
Meredith on the ground that Meredith involved an abstention-based dismissal, while
Thibodaux involved an abstention-based stay. The Thibodaux Court characterized the issue in
Meredith as “whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court” due to uncertain
state law, while the issue in Thibodaux was whether the district judge should be prohibited
from instituting a stay order to seek an interpretation of unclear state law from the Louisiana
courts. 360 U.S. at 28 n.2. The Court concluded that a district court properly exercises its
discretionary power when it stays proceedings in order to clarify state law, but not when it
dismisses a case for the same reason. Id. at 28 & n.2, 29.
84. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.
85. See id.
86. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
87. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29).
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order was a “wise and productive discharge” of its duty to exercise
jurisdiction.88
88. Id. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29); see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
188 (1959). In 1968, the Court decided Kaiser Steel, a case very similar to Thibodaux. In
Kaiser, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction claiming illegal
trespass by the defendant and seeking damages. Kaiser Steel Corp., 391 U.S. at 593. The
defendant conceded that it had trespassed, but claimed that a state statute permitted the
trespass for the purpose of using water rights the state had granted to it. Id. Because state law
was unclear and the same issues were pending before the state courts in a declaratory
judgment action, the defendant requested a stay until the state courts clarified the law. Id. at
593-94. Both the federal district court and the court of appeals denied the defendant’s motion
to stay. Id. at 594.
The Supreme Court reversed in a brief per curiam opinion. Id. at 593-94. The Court
reasoned that:
The state law issue [was] . . . of vital concern in the arid State of New Mexico, where
water is one of the most valuable natural resources. The issue, moreover, [was] a truly
novel one. The question [would] eventually have to be resolved by the New Mexico
courts, and since a declaratory judgment action [was] actually pending there, in all
likelihood that resolution [would] be forthcoming soon. Sound judicial administration
require[d] that the parties in this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law
which [would] apply to all other businesses and landowners concerned with the use of
this vital state resource.
Id. at 594. Thus, the Court remanded the case “with directions that the action be stayed.” Id.
The Court concluded its opinion by stating, “Federal jurisdiction will be retained in the
District Court in order to insure a just disposition of this litigation should anything prevent a
prompt state court determination.” Id.
Like Thibodaux, Kaiser was an action for damages. Thus, the abstention-based stay
ordered by the Court in Kaiser, like the stay in Thibodaux, was proper because it would
merely postpone the district court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. By staying the proceedings, the
district court would not improperly abdicate its duty to decide as it would if it dismissed the
case and remitted the parties to state court.
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., unlike Thibodaux and Kaiser, involved an
abstention-based dismissal by a district court in a diversity action for damages. In County of
Allegheny, the Allegheny County Board of Commissioners appropriated the plaintiffs’
property under the applicable state eminent domain statutes and then leased the property to a
company for “its private business use.” Id. at 187. The plaintiffs brought suit in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction alleging that settled state law prohibited the taking of private
property for private, rather than public, use. Id. at 187-88. They sought ouster of the County
and the company from the property, as well as damages. Although the plaintiff sought
damages, the district court in County of Allegheny, in contrast to the district court in
Thibodaux, dismissed the action “on the ground that it should not interfere with the
administration of the affairs of a political subdivision acting under color of State law in a
condemnation proceeding.” Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit
reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Thus, while the Court upheld an abstention-based stay in Thibodaux, an eminent domain
case where damages were sought, it would not approve an abstention-based dismissal in
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Thirty-seven years later in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court directly confronted the question of whether federal courts can
exercise their discretion to remand or dismiss actions for damages, as
opposed to those for discretionary relief, on abstention grounds.89 In
Quackenbush, the California insurance commissioner sued Allstate Insurance
Company in state court “seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate’s
alleged breach of certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general
declaration of Allstate’s obligations under those agreements.”90 Invoking
diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case and filed a motion to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.91 The commissioner then
moved for remand, arguing that the district court should abstain under
Burford because its resolution of the case might interfere with California’s
regulation of the insurance industry.92 Specifically, the commissioner
indicated that there was “a hotly disputed question of state law” involved in
the case, and that this question was already pending before the state courts.93
In contrast to the district court in Thibodaux, the district court in
Quackenbush remanded the case to state court on Burford abstention grounds
even though it was an action for damages.94 The district court primarily was
concerned that the state and federal courts might rule differently on the
disputed issue of state law and thereby produce inconsistent decisions.95 The
Ninth Circuit reversed,96 and the Supreme Court affirmed.97 The Court
concluded that abstention-based remands or dismissals of damages actions
are an improper use of the federal courts’ discretionary power; however,
federal courts may apply abstention principles to stay damages
County of Allegheny, also an eminent domain case where damages were sought. Quackenbush,
517 U.S. at 720 (distinguishing “between abstention-based remand orders or dismissals and
abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a federal suit”). Furthermore, while
Thibodaux and Kaiser are distinguishable because they involved stays while County of
Allegheny involved a dismissal, they also differ from County of Allegheny in that they
involved unclear issues of state law while the state law in County of Allegheny was settled. Id.
at 720-21; see also Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[S]ince the
controlling state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in
the interest of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication.”).
89. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706.
90. Id. at 709.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 710.
95. Id. at 709-10.
96. Id. at 710.
97. Id. at 711.
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proceedings.98 Because the case at bar was an action for damages, “the
District Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford
doctrine.”99
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it had long held that
federal courts may dismiss cases where equitable relief is sought and
exceptional circumstances are present.100 The Court also acknowledged that
over time it had expanded the power of federal courts to decline to exercise
their jurisdiction to all cases in which discretionary relief is sought and
exceptional circumstances are present.101 The Court pointed out, however,
that in prior abstention cases where damages were sought, it had only
permitted the federal court “to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication
of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal case altogether.”102 Quoting
Thibodaux, the Court again explained that “an order merely staying the
action ‘does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a
wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision
for its best fruition.’”103
Thus, the Quackenbush Court confirmed that in actions “at law,” federal
courts do not have the power to remand or dismiss on abstention grounds.104
If they do so in actions for damages, they improperly abdicate their duty to
exercise their jurisdiction.105 Federal courts do, however, have the power to
“apply[] abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay” and send
the parties to state court for resolution of a state law issue.106 A stay in an
action at law, in contrast to a remand or dismissal, does not constitute the
“abnegation of judicial duty”; a stay is merely a postponement of
adjudication.107
98. Id. at 721.
99. Id. at 731.
100. Id. at 716.
101. Id. at 718.
102. Id. at 719 (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 2830 (1959)).
103. Id. at 721 (quoting Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29).
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 730.
107. Id. at 721. The Quackenbush Court stated at the end of its opinion that because it
was deciding only the question of whether the district court’s dismissal was appropriate, it was
“unnecessary to determine whether a more limited abstention-based stay order would have
been warranted on the facts of [the] case.” Id. at 731. Nevertheless, the Court speculated that
“Burford might support a federal court’s decision to postpone adjudication of a damages
action pending the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law.” Id. at
730-31. The Court reasoned that it might have been appropriate for the district court to enter a
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C. Abstention Today
Federal courts abstain only in exceptional circumstances.108 They do so
“out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the
concern is with principles of comity and federalism.”109 The Court has
recognized that under its abstention case law, various types of abstention
exist.110 While the Court has warned that the abstention doctrines “‘are not
rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases,’”111 there are
nevertheless separate categories of abstention today. Three of these
categories—Pullman abstention, Thibodaux abstention, and Burford
abstention—are pertinent to this Article, and they are summarized below.112
First, federal courts abstain under Pullman “in cases presenting a federal
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different
posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.”113 When a

stay in the case at bar given the disputed issue of state law involved “and in the interest of
avoiding inconsistent adjudications on that point.” Id. at 731.
108. Id. at 716.
109. Id. at 723.
110. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
813-17 (1976) (“[Supreme Court] decisions have confined the circumstances appropriate for
abstention to three general categories.”).
111. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359
(1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987)).
112. The other two main categories of abstention are Younger abstention and Colorado
River abstention. When federal courts engage in Younger abstention, they refrain “from
hearing cases that would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding . . . or with certain
types of state civil proceedings.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716; see also Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). When federal courts engage in Colorado River abstention, they “refrain from
hearing cases . . . which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding.” Quackenbush, 517
U.S. at 717; see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. 800; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176
(1935). The Court has also approved of abstention in “cases whose resolution by a federal
court might unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes.”
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 717 (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.
293 (1943)).
113. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting County
of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)). As Judge Friendly explained:
One type of case almost universally recognized as appropriate for abstention is that of
a state statute, not yet construed by the state courts, which is susceptible of one
construction that would render it free from federal constitutional objection and
another that would not. A federal court should not place itself in the position of
holding the statute unconstitutional by giving it the latter construction, only to find
that the highest court of the state will render the decision futile and unnecessary by
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federal court abstains in these circumstances, it stays the proceedings in
federal court even though the plaintiff typically seeks equitable relief and the
court therefore has the discretionary power to dismiss. The court does so in
order to preserve the federal constitutional issue for decision in a federal
forum.114
Pullman abstention is inappropriate, however, when state law is clear.115
In addition, it is improper when the statute at issue is not “fairly subject to an
interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the
federal constitutional question.”116 Even if the state courts have never
interpreted the statute, a federal court should not abstain under Pullman “[i]f
the statute is not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction.”117
Second, federal courts abstain under Thibodaux when a case “rais[es]
issues ‘intimately involved with the States’ sovereign prerogative,’ the
proper adjudication of which might be impaired by unsettled questions of
state law.”118 At least in diversity cases, however, abstention-based remands

adopting the former. Such a decision not only is a waste of judicial resources but
provokes a needless collision between state and federal power.
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 93 (1973) (footnote omitted).
114. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980) (“Where a plaintiff
properly invokes federal-court jurisdiction in the first instance on a federal claim, the federal
court has a duty to accept that jurisdiction. Abstention may serve only to postpone rather than
to abdicate, jurisdiction, since its purpose is to determine whether resolution of the federal
question is even necessary, or to obviate the risk of a federal court’s erroneous construction of
state law.” (citations omitted)); England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964) (compelling a litigant who properly asserts federal constitutional claims in a federal
district court to have those claims decided by a state court “would be at war with the
unqualified terms in which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred
specific categories of jurisdiction upon the federal courts” and with the duty of federal courts
to exercise their jurisdiction when it is properly invoked); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (stating that the district court should not abstain unless the
constitutional claim could be fully protected while the state law issue was resolved in state
court).
115. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 469 (1987).
116. Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965)).
117. Id.
118. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (citing La. Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959)); see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814
(citing Thibodaux and Kaiser for the proposition that “[a]bstention is . . . appropriate where
there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.”).
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or dismissals based solely on unclear state law are not permitted under
Thibodaux.119
Finally, federal courts abstain under Burford when “the State’s interests
in maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem . . .
and retaining local control over difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import” outweigh “the strong federal
interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights,
adjudicated in federal court.”120 While there is no “formulaic test for
determining when dismissal under Burford is appropriate,”121 the exercise of
discretion must, as with the other abstention doctrines, “reflect ‘principles of
federalism and comity.’”122
When a federal court decides that a case falls into one of the abstention
categories and abstention is appropriate, the court must also decide whether
to grant an abstention-based dismissal or remand or an abstention-based stay.
To make this decision, the court must consider the type of relief sought in the
case. As the Quackenbush Court explained:
119. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816 (“[T]he mere potential for conflict in the results
of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.”
(citing Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)).
120. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Burford abstention is sometimes placed in the same category as Thibodaux abstention. See
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814-15 (discussing Burford abstention in the same category as
Thibodaux abstention). But see New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 359-60 (1989) (“While we acknowledge that the various types of abstention are not
rigid pigeonholes into which the federal courts must try to fit cases . . . the policy
considerations supporting Burford . . . are sufficiently distinct to justify independent
analyses.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
121. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727.
122. Id. at 728 (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). In dicta, the
Quackenbush Court concluded that Burford abstention was inappropriate on the facts of that
case. Id. at 731. The Court reasoned that the federal interests were strong, while the state
interests were comparatively weak. Specifically, “Allstate’s motion to compel arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act implicate[d] a substantial federal concern for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.” Id. at 708. On the state interest side of the equation,
however, the case appeared “to present nothing more than a run-of-the-mill contract dispute.”
Id. at 729. Furthermore, by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the “hotly contested”
issue of state law had been resolved by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 729.
Consequently, there was no longer a concern that the federal and states courts would rule
inconsistently on the issue. See id. at 729-30. Thus, the Court concluded “that the District
Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.” Id. at 731. The
Court acknowledged, however, that because it was deciding only whether the district court’s
abstention-based dismissal in a damages action was proper, it did not “find it necessary to
inquire fully as to whether this case presents the sort of ‘exceptional circumstance’ in which
Burford abstention or other grounds for yielding federal jurisdiction might be appropriate.” Id.
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[I]n cases where the relief being sought is equitable in nature or otherwise
discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to stay the action based
on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing
123
the suit or remanding it to state court.

In damages actions, however, federal courts do not have the power to dismiss
or remand based on abstention principles.124 They can only postpone the
exercise of their jurisdiction by entering an abstention-based stay and
remitting the parties to state court.125
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND CERTIFICATION
While the Supreme Court has approved of abstention-based stays, it also
has recognized that sending the parties to state court to endure “a full round
of litigation”126 is costly for both the judicial system and the litigants. Thus,
the Court has endorsed the use of certification in at least some federal
question cases involving state law claims and in diversity cases.127
Certification is a “procedure” that allows a federal court faced with an
unsettled issue of state law to stay its proceedings and “put the question
directly to the State’s highest court.”128 In contrast to abstention, it “does not
require litigating a new lawsuit through state appellate review.”129 As a
result, it is typically both faster and less expensive than granting an
abstention-based stay.130 In addition, because certified questions are sent
directly to a state’s highest court, certification “increas[es] the assurance of
gaining an authoritative response” from the only court that can provide
one.131 Accordingly, “certification of novel or unsettled questions of state
123. Id. at 721.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).
127. See infra Part III.A-B.
128. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 76. For a discussion of the history of certification and an
overview of the certification procedure, see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering
Principle and Congress’s Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress’s Power to Compel
State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650-59
(1999).
129. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism:
Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 381 (2000).
130. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 76.
131. Id.
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law . . . may save ‘time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative
judicial federalism.’”132
Today, almost all states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico permit certification.133 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has
employed certification in federal question cases involving state law claims.134
In the federal question context, the Court has provided some guidance to the
lower courts regarding when certification is appropriate. Specifically, the
Court has suggested that certification is warranted in a federal question case
where Pullman abstention otherwise would be justified.135 In the diversity
context, however, the Court has provided little guidance to the lower courts
regarding the circumstances under which certification is appropriate.
A. Certification in Federal Question Cases Involving State Law Claims
The Supreme Court primarily has addressed certification in the context
of federal constitutional litigation involving state statutes. The Court has said
that “[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated by . . . ‘Pullman
abstention.’”136 Thus, the Court has endorsed the use of certification in the
same circumstances in which it has approved Pullman abstention137 and has
certified questions itself or remanded cases for certification on Pullman
grounds.138 Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished certification from
132. Id. at 77 (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)).
133. Only two states, Arkansas and North Carolina, do not have a certification
procedure. While Missouri has a certification statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 477.004 (2007), the
Missouri Supreme Court has declined to answer certified questions on the ground that the
Missouri Constitution does not permit it to do so. See Zeman v. V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc., 911
F.2d 107, 109 (8th Cir. 1990) (“On July 13, 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding the certification statute, the Missouri constitution did not grant the Missouri
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to render opinions on questions of law certified by federal
courts and declined to answer the certified question.”).
134. See infra Part III.A.
135. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 75-76 (“Certification today covers territory once
dominated by . . . ‘Pullman abstention’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
136. Id. at 75.
137. E.g., id. at 76 (stating that the availability of certification makes it unnecessary
for the parties to institute a new lawsuit in state court in order to obtain clarification of “statelaw questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues”).
138. See, e.g., Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157, 157-58 (2001) (certifying in a federal
habeas corpus death penalty case where the district court and court of appeals had interpreted
a state rule of criminal procedure differently and where under one interpretation the prisoner’s
constitutional claims would be waived, but under the other interpretation the claims could be
heard on the merits); id. at 159-60 (stating that the state supreme court’s answer to the
certified question would “help determine the proper state-law predicate for [the Court’s]
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abstention, suggesting that the Court would approve the use of certification
in federal question cases other than those that satisfy the criteria for Pullman
abstention.139
In its earliest certification case involving a federal constitutional
question, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,140 the Supreme Court appeared
to sanction the use of certification to resolve unclear issues of state law
where Pullman abstention otherwise would be warranted. In Clay, the
plaintiff bought an insurance policy from the defendant when he was a
citizen of Illinois.141 The defendant was licensed to do business in Illinois
and several other states, including Florida.142 The policy provided for worldwide coverage against personal property loss and “required that suit on any
claim for loss must be brought within twelve months of the discovery of the
loss.”143 After the plaintiff bought the policy, he moved to Florida and
suffered personal property damage.144 The defendant refused to pay, and the
plaintiff filed suit in federal court more than two years after he discovered his
loss.145 The defendant defended, in pertinent part, on the ground “that under
the time limitation for bringing suit, a restriction concededly valid under
Illinois law, the suit was barred.”146
determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in [the] case”); Fiore v. White, 528
U.S. 23, 25 (1999) (certifying a question in a federal habeas corpus case where interpretation
of state law would determine whether petitioner’s conviction would be set aside); id. at 29
(stating that the state supreme court’s answer to the certified question would “help determine
the proper state-law predicate for [the Court’s] determination of the federal constitutional
questions raised in [the] case”); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 386 (1988)
(certifying two questions in a First Amendment case where “an authoritative construction of
the Virginia statute by the Virginia Supreme Court would substantially aid [the Court’s]
review of [the] constitutional holding [below], and might well determine the case entirely”);
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 650-51, 661-62 & n.15 (1978) (certifying a question of state
common law because the constitutional issues could not be resolved without first deciding the
state law question as to which there were no controlling state law precedents, and there had
been no showing that a constitutional decision was necessary); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
133, 148 (1976) (remanding for certification of state law questions regarding the proper
construction of a state statute that was susceptible to “an interpretation [that] would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute”); see also Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963).
139. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79.
140. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
141. Id. at 208-09.
142. Id. at 208.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The district court applied Florida’s “five-year limitation for actions on
written contracts,” and the case went to trial.147 The court of appeals reversed
on the ground that application of Florida’s statute of limitations to a contract
made in Illinois violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.148
In the process of reaching its decision, the court considered whether
Florida’s statute of limitations applied to the policy.149 The court did not
decide “this threshold question,” however, apparently because “it could not,
on the available materials, make a confident guess how the Florida Supreme
Court would construe the statute.”150 Instead, the court determined that it
would decide the constitutional issue “that [was] presented only if the statute
did apply.”151
Relying on the “doctrine that the Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it,”152 the Clay
Court found that, because resolution of the state law issue could have ended
the case, the court of appeals should have decided the state law issues first
and then, only if necessary, decided the due process issue.153 The Court
explained that the requirement that courts decide constitutional questions
only if necessary is “a well-settled doctrine . . . which, because it carries a
special weight in maintaining proper harmony in federal-state relations, must
not yield to the claim of the relatively minor inconvenience of postponement
of decision.”154 The Court ultimately vacated the court of appeals’ decision
and remanded the case for determination of the state law questions.155
In doing so, the Court recognized that the case involved unclear issues of
state law.156 The Court noted, however, that “[t]he Florida Legislature, with
rare foresight, ha[d] dealt with the problem of authoritatively determining
unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits
a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme
Court of Florida for its decision.”157 The Court further noted that even where
certification statutes were unavailable it had “frequently deemed it
appropriate, where a federal constitutional question might be mooted
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 209 & n.2.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209, 212.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
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thereby, to secure an authoritative state court’s determination of an
unresolved question of its local law.”158 Thus, in a case with facts very
similar to Pullman,159 the Court seemed to suggest that since Florida had a
certification statute, the lower court should consider certifying the unclear
questions of state law on remand rather than engaging in abstention.
In contrast, in City of Houston v. Hill160 the Court refused to abstain or
certify under Pullman. In Hill, the Court faced “the question whether a
municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the
performance of his or her duties is unconstitutionally overbroad under the
First Amendment.”161 The City asked the Court to abstain under Pullman,
and the Court refused.162 The Court explained that abstention was
inappropriate because the ordinance at issue was “not susceptible to a
limiting construction” that would render it constitutional.163 The Court noted
that the Texas appellate courts had not yet interpreted the statute,164 but
pointed out that “Houston’s Municipal Courts . . . [had] had numerous
opportunities to narrow the scope of the ordinance.”165 The Court also said
that even where no state court has interpreted a statute, a federal court need
not abstain if the statute is unambiguous.166 Thus, the Court concluded, “if
[a] statute is not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction, then even if
the statute has ‘never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal . . . it is the duty
of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.’”167

158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
161. Id. at 453.
162. Id. at 467-68.
163. Id. at 468. In reaching its decision, the Court said that it was “particularly
reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment,” but
“[e]ven if [the] case did not involve a facial challenge under the First Amendment, [it] would
find abstention inappropriate.” Id. at 467-68. In a footnote, the Court also commented on the
lateness of the City’s request for abstention. Id. at 467 n.16. The Court noted that the City “did
not raise the abstention issue until after it had lost on the merits before the panel of the Court
of Appeals.” Id. Until that point, the City had argued “that the ordinance was both
unambiguous and constitutional on its face.” Id. The Court said that “[t]hese circumstances
undercut the force of the city’s argument, but [did] not bar [the Court] from considering it.”
Id.
164. Id. at 469-70.
165. Id. at 470 (“[W]here municipal courts have regularly applied an unambiguous
statute, there is certainly no need for a federal court to abstain until state appellate courts have
an opportunity to construe it.”).
166. Id. at 469.
167. Id. at 468 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)).
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The Hill Court also emphasized that “[t]he possibility of certification
[did] not change [its] analysis.”168 The Court noted that “certification . . . is
useful in reducing the substantial burdens of cost and delay that abstention
places on litigants.”169 The Court explained, however, that certification, like
Pullman abstention, is inappropriate “where . . . there is no uncertain
question of state law whose resolution might affect the pending federal
claim.”170 Thus, because the ordinance in the case at bar was “neither
ambiguous nor obviously susceptible of a limiting construction,” the Court
could discern no reason to abstain or certify under Pullman.171
More recently, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,172 the
Supreme Court discussed certification at length in dicta and suggested that
the lower courts should have certified the state law question at issue based on
Pullman abstention principles. In Arizonans, Arizona amended its state
constitution to provide that English was “‘the official language of the State
of Arizona’–‘the language of . . . all government functions and actions.’”173
The plaintiff, a state employee who spoke both English and Spanish, filed
suit in federal court alleging that the amendment violated the U.S.
Constitution.174 The district court and the Ninth Circuit held that the
amendment was unconstitutional.175 Despite the state Attorney General’s
request for certification and the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court had not
interpreted the amendment, the lower courts refused to certify the question of
the amendment’s proper interpretation.176 The lower courts reasoned that
certification was unwarranted because the language of the amendment was
“plain” and “the Attorney General’s limiting construction unpersuasive.”177
The Supreme Court declared the case moot because the plaintiff had left
her job as a state employee for a private position during the course of the
168. Id. at 470.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 471.
171. Id. at 471; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000) (refusing to
certify in a case where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state abortion statute
that had not been construed by the state courts because, inter alia, “[c]ertification of a question
(or abstention) is appropriate only where the statute is ‘fairly susceptible’ to a narrowing
construction” and the statute at issue was not susceptible to such a construction (citation
omitted)).
172. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
173. Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1(1), (2)).
174. Id. at 50.
175. Id. at 55, 78.
176. Id. at 62.
177. Id. at 76.
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litigation.178 Nonetheless, the Court went on to reprimand the district court
and the Ninth Circuit for failing to certify “[g]iven the novelty of the
question and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona’s business,
plus the views of the Attorney General and [the amendment’s] sponsors”179
that a limiting construction of the statute was possible.180
Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principles underlying Pullman
abstention.181 It explained that in order to avoid “premature adjudication of
constitutional questions” and “friction-generating error,” federal courts
should be very careful about deciding the constitutionality of state statutes
that have not been construed by the state’s highest court.182 The Court said:
“Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the
absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . .
the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification
from a federal court.”183 The Court concluded that the district court and the
Ninth Circuit should have been more “cautious” in approaching the question
whether certification was appropriate.184 Thus, the Court endorsed the use of
certification in a case that otherwise satisfied the criteria for Pullman
abstention because it involved a state statute that had never been interpreted
and might be construed by the state courts so as to moot the constitutional
issue.
178. Id. at 72.
179. Id. at 78.
180. Id. The Court’s discourse on certification is interesting given its decision that the
case was moot. The Court did not stop at chastising the lower courts and discussing
certification at length in dicta. The Court went to some lengths to ensure that the federal
system left no footprints on the state constitutional amendment at issue. First, the Court did
not simply dismiss the case. Id. at 75. Instead, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. Id. at 80. By vacating the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment, the Court effectively erased that court’s interpretation of the
amendment. Furthermore, the Court specifically stated that it “express[ed] no view on the
correct interpretation of” the amendment or its constitutionality. Id. at 49. At the time the
federal case reached the Supreme Court, the question of the proper interpretation of the statute
was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 63 n.18. The state case had been stayed
pending the Supreme Court’s decision. Id. The Supreme Court noted that given its decision,
the Arizona Supreme Court could “rule definitively on the proper construction” of the
amendment. Id. at 80. The Court opined that once the state supreme court had ruled,
“adjudication of any remaining federal constitutional question may indeed become greatly
simplified.” Id.
181. See discussion supra Part II.A.
182. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
184. Id. at 77.
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Despite the Court’s statement that “[c]ertification today covers territory
once dominated by . . . ‘Pullman abstention’”185 and its endorsement of
certification in cases, like Arizonans, that are similar to Pullman, the Court
has not explicitly limited certification in federal question cases involving
state law claims to federal constitutional litigation. Moreover, in Arizonans,
the Court specifically distinguished certification from abstention. Echoing
the “exceptional circumstances” language of the abstention doctrines, the
Ninth Circuit in Arizonans “found ‘no unique circumstances . . . militating in
favor of certification.’”186 The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth
Circuit had improperly “[b]lend[ed] abstention with certification.”187 The
Court then stated unequivocally: “Novel, unsettled questions of state law,
however, not ‘unique circumstances,’ are necessary before federal courts
may avail themselves of state certification procedures.”188 It is unclear
whether the Arizonans Court intended to sanction the use of certification in
federal question cases whenever “novel, unsettled questions of state law” are
involved, regardless of the underlying circumstances of the case. The Court’s
statement, however, seems to suggest that it has opened the door to that
interpretation.
B. Diversity Certification
In the diversity context, the Supreme Court has addressed certification in
only one case: Lehman Bros. v. Schein.189 Lehman involved three
shareholders’ derivative suits that were filed in federal district court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction and consolidated on appeal.190 The district
court concluded that Florida law applied to the disputes and that, under
Florida law, the cases must be dismissed.191 Although the court of appeals
found that Florida law was unclear, it nonetheless reversed the district court
and held that under Florida law the plaintiffs could recover.192
185. Id. at 75.
186. Id. at 79 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931
(9th Cir. 1995)).
187. Id.
188. Id. The Court noted, as it had previously, that certification does not “entail the
delay[], expense, and procedural complexity that generally attend abstention decisions” and
that “[t]aking advantage of certification . . . may ‘greatly simplif[y]’ an ultimate adjudication
in federal court.” Id. (citation omitted).
189. 416 U.S. 386, 387 (1974).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 388-89.
192. Id. at 389.
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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the cases so that the court could “reconsider whether the
controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme
Court.”193 The Court said that certification seemed “particularly appropriate
in view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida
law.”194 The Court made clear, however, that even where state law is unclear
and certification is available, certification is not mandatory.195 Rather, the
Court said that the decision whether to use certification “in a given case rests
in the sound discretion of the federal court.”196
By remanding Lehman for consideration of whether certification was
warranted, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of certification under the
same circumstances in which it had rejected abstention in Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven.197 Meredith, like Lehman was a diversity case that involved
unclear state law.198 The court of appeals in Meredith dismissed the case
because it believed that the case should be decided in a state forum.199 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on the ground that abstention is
inappropriate where state law is uncertain but where there are no exceptional
circumstances present.200 As the Lehman Court explained, Meredith “teaches
that the mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting
the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit.”201 Thus, by
sanctioning the use of certification in Lehman under circumstances in which
it would not have approved of abstention, the Court implicitly distinguished
certification in diversity cases from abstention in diversity cases.
Furthermore, by specifically stating in Lehman that the difficulty of state law
will not support sending the parties to state court “for the start of another
lawsuit”202 and yet approving certification, the Court suggested that
certification where state law is unclear is proper precisely because it does not
require a full round of litigation in state court.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 391.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 231 (1943).
Id.
Id. at 234-35, 238.
Lehman, 416 U.S. at 390.
Id.
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IV. CERTIFICATION BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS IN DIVERSITY CASES
Given the Court’s suggestion in both federal question cases involving
state-law claims and diversity cases that certification and abstention are two
separate doctrines203 and the Court’s apparent endorsement in Lehman of
certification in diversity cases where state law is unclear,204 it would be
reasonable to expect that federal appellate courts205 would have adopted the
“Lehman approach” to certification in diversity cases. Surprisingly, however,
the circuits generally have not done so. Instead, at least six of the circuits
tend to rely on abstention principles derived from the Thibodaux and Burford
abstention doctrines to determine when they should certify.206 In particular,
these courts require “exceptional circumstances” before they will certify. The
First Circuit, on the other hand, takes a dual approach to certification,
employing both the abstention-based approach and the Lehman approach to
certification. Four circuits appear to lean exclusively toward the Lehman
approach,207 while one circuit, the Tenth, takes an ad hoc approach that is
impossible to classify.208 In addition, all of the circuits, at times, also
consider “secondary” factors in deciding whether to certify.209
203. See supra Part III.A-B.
204. See supra Part III.B.
205. For purposes of this Article, the phrases “federal circuit courts” and “federal
appellate courts” refer to the First through Eleventh Circuits and the District of Columbia
Circuit.
206. See supra Part II.A-C. The circuits that rely on abstention principles to determine
when certification is appropriate are the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit, the
Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit.
207. These circuits are the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
208. The Tenth Circuit has said, in more than one diversity case, that “certification is
appropriate ‘where the legal question at issue is novel and the applicable state law is unsettled’
. . . .” Enfield v. A.B. Chance Co., 228 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Ins.
Co., 397 F.3d 897, 900 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (same). In the cases where the court has made this
statement, however, it has declined to certify. E.g., id. (declining to certify because state law
was settled); Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255 (declining to certify because the party “did not seek
certification until after it received an adverse decision from the district court”); Brown, 920
F.2d at 667 (declining to certify because state law was settled). Thus, these cases do not
necessarily indicate that the Tenth Circuit will certify when state law is uncertain.
Furthermore, in discussing certification, the Tenth Circuit has quoted Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), for the proposition that federal courts have a duty to
decide state law issues absent exceptional circumstances. See Copier v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the district court’s refusal to certify); see
also Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255 (“‘[U]nder the diversity statutes the federal courts have the duty
to decide questions of state law even if difficult or uncertain.’” (quoting Copier, 138 F.3d at
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A. Federal Appellate Courts and Abstention-based Certification
The District of Columbia, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits use an abstention-based approach to certification. In deciding
whether to certify in diversity cases, these circuits commonly ask: (1)
whether state law is unsettled; and (2) whether an interest of sufficient
importance to the State is involved. In analyzing the second factor, the
circuits are concerned about whether considerations of federal-state comity
indicate that the issue before them is one that warrants certification.
Accordingly, like the Thibodaux and Burford Courts, the circuits examine
whether the issue is “intimately” related to the state’s “sovereign
prerogative,”210 whether the issue is one of “vital public concern,”211 whether
the state has an interest in “maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an
essentially local problem,”212 or whether the state has an interest in “retaining
local control over difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems
of substantial public import.”213 While the circuits do not often use this
precise language from the abstention cases to describe the second factor, they
do employ very similar language and appear to be equating certification with
838)). Confusingly, however, the Tenth Circuit has also recognized that in Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), the Supreme Court said that “‘[n]ovel,
unsettled questions of state law . . . not ‘unique circumstances,’ are necessary before federal
courts’” can certify. Copier, 138 F.3d at 839 (quoting Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79). To
complicate matters further, in most, if not all, of its published certification cases, the Tenth
Circuit has declined to certify for myriad reasons, none of which are related to whether the
issue involved is sufficiently important to the State. Given the Tenth Circuit’s contradictory
statements regarding whether it follows the Lehman approach or an abstention-based approach
to certification and the lack of case law establishing that it follows either method, it is
impossible to classify the court’s approach. Due to the lack of diversity cases in which the
Tenth Circuit has certified, perhaps the most that can be said is that the court is very reluctant
to certify and views certification with great circumspection.
209. These factors are: (1) whether the issue is or may be dispositive; (2) the likely
recurrence of the issue; (3) the timing of the request for certification; (4) whether the party
requesting certification chose the federal forum; and (5) whether the denial of certification
will lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws. They are “secondary”
because the circuits sometimes apply them and sometimes ignore them. In addition, a factor
that receives weight in one case may not be mentioned in another case. The secondary factors
are discussed infra Part V.
210. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 118.
212. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996); see also supra notes
120-25 and accompanying text.
213. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728; see also supra notes 120-25 and accompanying
text.
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abstention by, in effect, requiring exceptional circumstances before they will
certify. For the most part, however, the circuits do not acknowledge that they
are relying on abstention principles or explain their reasoning for taking this
approach to certification.
The District of Columbia Circuit provides an illustration of the
abstention-based approach to certification. The D.C. Circuit certifies where
state law is “‘genuinely uncertain’ with respect to the dispositive question . .
. and . . . the case ‘is one of extreme public importance.’”214 In Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richardson,215 for example, the plaintiff worked as
a security guard in an apartment complex managed by a District of Columbia
company.216 The company purchased a comprehensive general liability
insurance policy from Nationwide for the apartment complex.217 The policy
included a pollution exclusion clause which “exclude[d] liability coverage
for injuries or damage arising out of events involving the release or escape of
‘pollutants.’”218 While the plaintiff worked at the complex, she allegedly was
exposed to carbon monoxide that leaked from one or more gas furnaces.219
The plaintiff sued the company in state court claiming that she was injured
from exposure to carbon monoxide fumes.220 Nationwide then filed a
declaratory judgment action in federal district court in the District of
Columbia “seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or
indemnify”221 the company because the pollution exclusion clause barred
coverage for the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.222 The district court agreed with
Nationwide and granted its motion for summary judgment.223
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit certified the question whether “the pollution
exclusion clause appl[ied] to injuries arising from alleged carbon monoxide
poisoning” to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.224 The court
214. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Cf. Karen
LeCraft Henderson, Certification: (Over)due Deference?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 637, 638
(1995) (stating that in the D.C. Circuit, the decision whether to certify “usually turns on the
clarity of state law”).
215. 270 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
216. Id. at 951.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 950.
219. Id. at 951.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 951-52.
224. Id. at 950-51.
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reasoned that certification was warranted because District of Columbia law
was genuinely uncertain: the District of Columbia courts had not addressed
the scope of the pollution exclusion clause, and other jurisdictions that had
interpreted similar clauses had reached conflicting conclusions.225 The court
further reasoned that it should certify because “the question [was] one of
significant import to the public.”226 The clause was a common feature of
commercial comprehensive general liability policies, and its interpretation
therefore “potentially affect[ed] the insurance coverage of most businesses in
the District of Columbia.”227 Thus, in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit
essentially applied abstention principles to determine whether certification
was appropriate.228
The Second Circuit’s approach to certification, like the D.C. Circuit’s,
demonstrates the use of certification as a proxy for abstention in diversity
cases. Interestingly, the Second Circuit has stated specifically that
certification is proper “only where there is a split of authority on the issue,
where [a] statute’s plain language does not indicate the answer, or when
presented with a complex question of [state] common law for which no
[state] authority can be found.”229 This suggests that the Second Circuit has
adopted the Lehman approach to certification in diversity cases and asks only
whether state law is sufficiently unclear in deciding whether to certify.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit usually considers not only whether state
law is unclear, but also whether the issue involves important state public

225. Id. at 952.
226. Id. at 950.
227. Id.
228. The D.C. Circuit has used abstention principles to decide whether to certify other
diversity cases. See, e.g., Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(declining to certify the question of whether there was a private right of action under a District
of Columbia statute because the “precedent regarding implied private rights of action [was]
reasonably clear” and the case “[was] not one of ‘extreme public importance’ in the District of
Columbia”); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(certifying a question regarding “the conditions under which . . . police officers will be held
liable in tort for actions taken in the course of performing their public functions” because state
law was genuinely uncertain and the case was one of extreme public importance); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (certifying where state law was
uncertain and “the State . . . ha[d] a very substantial interest in [the] dispute”).
229. Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1992). In a
case decided five years after Riordan the Second Circuit said, “Riordan establishes the
standard applicable in this Circuit for determining whether it is appropriate to certify a
question to a state court.” McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997).
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policy considerations.230 Thus, in deciding whether to certify in a diversity
case, the Second Circuit actually uses a standard that is similar to the D.C.
Circuit’s and also appears to be derived from abstention principles.231
Very recently, for example, in Colavito v. New York Organ Donor
Network, Inc.,232 the Second Circuit certified several “novel questions of
[state] statutory interpretation” that involved an “important and sensitive area
of state law and policy” to the New York Court of Appeals.233 The plaintiff
in Colavito had end-stage renal disease.234 When he did not receive a kidney
that allegedly had been directly donated to him, he brought suit in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction against the New York Organ Donor
Network (“NYODN”) and two NYODN officials.235 The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants had engaged in fraud and had committed the common
law tort of conversion by violating New York Public Health Law.236 The
plaintiff also asserted a private right of action under New York Public Health
Law.237 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

230. See, e.g., Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 229 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“Where unsettled and significant questions of state law will control the outcome of
a case, we may certify those questions . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 396 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2005) (certifying where the case
involved “unsettled and significant” issues of state law); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6,
25-26 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n deciding whether to certify . . . this Court looks to both the extent
of existing state precedent and the nature of the questions to be asked. In particular, whether to
certify a question depends to some extent upon whether the question implicates issues of state
public policy.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Burlington v. Indem.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying questions because the state
courts had not yet ruled on the issues and because the issues involved “important public policy
considerations” for the state); N.Y. Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 750, 756 (2d Cir.
2003) (certifying a “significant and novel public policy question”).
231. See, e.g., DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We do not
believe this case presents any of the exceptional circumstances that would justify using the
certification procedure.” (emphasis added)); Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957
(2d Cir. 1987) (stating that certification is a “valuable device for securing prompt and
authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law, especially those that seem likely to
recur and to have significance beyond the interests of the parties in a particular lawsuit”). Cf.
Kaye & Weissman, supra note 129, at 397-422 (2000) (discussing New York’s experience
with certification).
232. 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006).
233. Id. at 216, 229.
234. Id. at 217.
235. Id. at 217, 219-20.
236. Id. at 220.
237. Id.
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judgment to the defendants on the fraud claim, but “reserve[d] decision on
the remaining issues” and certified several questions.238
Specifically, the Second Circuit said that before it reached the merits of
the plaintiff’s other claims, it had to determine whether those claims even
existed under state public health law.239 After examining the statutory
sections at issue, the court concluded that it could not determine whether the
claims “[gave] rise to enforceable rights for individuals.”240 The court
ultimately held that certification was appropriate because the statutory
language was ambiguous and there was very little pertinent case law
interpreting the statutory provisions.241 In addition, the court reasoned that
certification was justified because it did not have the “experience, expertise,
or authority” to ascertain the public policy underlying the statutes at issue.242
According to the court, the goal behind the statutes—increasing organ
donation—could be achieved either by protecting “organ procurement
organizations from liability or by giving donors and donees enforceable
rights to remedy and deter misconduct.”243 The court concluded that “it
would be imprudent to embark on an excursion . . . into the state statutory
incentive structure in this important and sensitive area of state law and
policy.”244 Therefore, after applying abstention principles, the Second Circuit
determined that certification was warranted.245
A case from the Seventh Circuit, Doe v. American National Red
Cross,246 provides an additional compelling example of a court’s tacit use of
abstention principles to decide whether to certify.247 The Doe court certified
238. Id. at 232-33.
239. Id. at 223.
240. Id. at 228.
241. Id. at 229.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 976 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1992).
247. While the Seventh Circuit has said that it considers multiple factors in deciding
whether to certify, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2002), its
case law (including Doe) indicates that the court primarily considers whether state law is
uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently important to the State. See, e.g., Menards, 285
F.3d at 639 (certifying a question about the applicable statute of limitations primarily because
the intermediate appellate courts were in conflict, the state supreme court “[had] not had an
opportunity to address the question squarely,” and “[s]tatutes of limitations reflect significant
policy choices by the state and have grave consequences for the administration of justice
within the state”); Valerio v. Home Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 226, 229 (7th Cir. 1996) (certifying a
question regarding the proper interpretation of a phrase in an insurance policy because the
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the question of “[w]hether a blood bank, sued in negligence for failing
properly to screen donors and test blood or blood products, is ‘a person who
is a health care provider’ within the meaning of the Wisconsin medical
malpractice statute of limitations.”248 Using abstention language without
citing abstention cases, the court said that certification was appropriate
because the issue “concern[ed] a matter of vital public concern” and “an
appropriate respect for the prerogatives and responsibilities of Wisconsin”
required that the state supreme court decide the issue.249 The Doe court
further reasoned that certification was justified because, inter alia, state law
was uncertain.250 Thus, the Doe court, like the Richardson and Colavito
courts, required “exceptional circumstances,” as well as uncertain state law,
before it would certify.251

answer would “control the outcome of [the] appeal;” the state courts had “not yet construed
[the] phrase, which [was] common to many policies;” and the state had a “significant interest
in the interpretation and enforcement of insurance policies executed within its borders”);
Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1995) (certifying where there were no state
decisions on point and the question had “important implications for the state”).
248. Doe, 976 F.2d at 376.
249. Id. at 374; see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594
(1968) (finding that the lower courts should have abstained because, inter alia, the issue was
one of “vital concern” to the state); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
28 (1959) (approving abstention because, inter alia, the state law issue was “intimately
involved with [the state’s] sovereign prerogative”). For a detailed discussion of Kaiser and
Thibodaux, see supra Part II.B.
250. Doe, 976 F.2d at 375. The Doe court also found that certification was appropriate
because allowing the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide the question would “ensure that
Wisconsin’s public policy [was], from the outset, applied evenhandedly to all litigants
whether they [found] themselves in a state or federal forum,” and the answer to the certified
question would determine whether the cause of action survived. Id. at 374; see infra Part V.
251. Like the D.C., Second, and Seventh Circuits, the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
also have applied abstention principles to decide whether certification is justified.
The Third Circuit has taken a somewhat circuitous route to adopting its certification
factors. Judge Becker first wrote in dissent that “a federal court should be authorized to certify
a question of law to the state court when: (1) the issue is one of importance; (2) it may be
determinative of the litigation; and (3) state law does not provide controlling precedent
through which the federal court could resolve the issue.” Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal
Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting). In Hakimoglu, the court
faced the question of “whether under New Jersey law a casino patron may recover from a
casino for gambling losses caused by the casino’s conduct in serving alcoholic beverages to
the patron and allowing the patron to continue to gamble after it becomes obvious that the
patron is intoxicated.” Id. at 292 (majority opinion). According to Judge Becker, Hakimoglu
was a “textbook case for certification” because the issue was “determinative of the litigation;
important public policy issues [were] at stake; and little authority guide[d] [the court’s]
decision.” Id. at 304 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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B. Federal Appellate Courts and the Lehman Approach to Certification
1. The Dual Approach to Certification
In contrast to the circuits that seem to equate certification with
abstention, the First Circuit uses a somewhat schizophrenic approach to
certification. It sometimes applies abstention principles to decide whether to
certify and, at other times, employs the Lehman approach to certification. For
example, the First Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a]bsent controlling
state court precedent, [it] . . . may certify a state law issue to the state’s

Although Judge Becker proposed his certification factors in dissent, the other panel
judges, Nygaard and Alito, joined the part of Judge Becker’s dissent that discussed
certification “and enthusiastically endorse[d] his recommendations therein.” Id. at 293 n.2
(majority opinion). Nonetheless, certification was not an option in Hakimoglu because the
case involved New Jersey law and, at that time, New Jersey did not have a certification
procedure. Id. at 304 (Becker, J., dissenting). Thus, even though Judges Nygaard and Alito
joined the section of Judge Becker’s dissent on certification to form a majority, Judge
Becker’s proposed certification factors were merely dicta.
Since Hakimoglu, however, the Third Circuit appears to have adopted Judge Becker’s
factors for deciding whether certification is proper. See Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v.
DiBartolo, 171 F.3d 168, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (declining to certify because “the issue was
neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently difficult to command the attention” of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court); see also Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 426 F.3d 671, 675 (3d
Cir. 2005) (certifying in a federal question case because it could not “predict with confidence
how the [state] Supreme Court would decide the issues presented” and because “the questions
of law certified [were] of . . . substantial public importance”).
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits also generally apply abstention principles in diversity cases
to determine whether certification is warranted. See, e.g., Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin
Paving, L.P., 381 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Because the issue whether punitive damages
awards are insurable under Texas public policy is significant for Texas law and because the
Texas intermediate courts have reached competing rulings with no definitive guidance from
the Supreme Court of Texas, we hereby certify the . . . question.”); Kremen v. Cohen, 325
F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The certification procedure is reserved for state law
questions that present significant issues, including those with important public policy
ramifications, and that have not yet been resolved by the state courts.”); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v.
Jacobsen, 197 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (certifying a question where there was “no
clearly controlling precedent in the case law of the California appellate courts” and the answer
would “resolve an important question of insurance law . . . that . . . [was] best determined by
the California Supreme Court rather than a federal court”); Free v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 164 F.3d
270, 274 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ertification may be advisable where important state interests are
at stake and the state courts have not provided clear guidance on how to proceed.”) (citing
Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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highest court.”252 Moreover, the First Circuit often takes the Lehman
approach to certification and considers primarily whether state law is
uncertain in deciding whether to certify. Thus, in Reagan v. Racal Mortgage,
Inc.,253 the First Circuit certified where the state statute at issue was
ambiguous and the statute’s “interpretive case law”254 did not permit the
court to “conclusively determine whether [the statute] applie[d] to [the]
case.”255 Recently, the First Circuit even seemed to recognize the distinction
between abstention and certification when it stated in a diversity case that
abstention was inappropriate because exceptional circumstances were not
present, but certification was available to obtain a proper interpretation of the
state statute at issue.256 In some instances, however, the First Circuit takes an
abstention-based approach to certification in diversity cases and asks both
whether state law is uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently
“important” to warrant certification.257
2. The Lehman Approach to Certification
The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to employ
primarily the Lehman approach to certification. Multiple Eleventh Circuit
cases demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit, more than any other, certifies
solely because state law is unclear.258 In contrast to the numerous diversity
252. E.g., Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting VanHaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
253. 135 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998).
254. Id. at 45.
255. Id. at 44; see also CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46
F.3d 1211, 1222 (1st Cir. 1995) (certifying a question where state law was unclear and the
issue was determinative of the appeal).
256. Sevigny v. Employers Ins. of Wasau, 411 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2005); see also
Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 55 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1995) (federal question case) (“While
uncertainty or difficulty regarding state law is generally not sufficient to justify traditional
abstention, it may be enough to counsel certification where that procedure is available.”
(citing Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), and Lehman Bros. v. Schein,
416 U.S. 386 (1974))).
257. E.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 103 (1st Cir. 1999)
(certifying a question where state law was unclear and the issue to be decided was
“quintessentially a policy judgment appropriately made for the state by its own courts”); Med.
Prof’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Breon Labs., Inc., 141 F.3d 372, 376 (1st Cir. 1998) (certifying where
the issue was “sufficiently unclear and important”).
258. In its certification cases, the Eleventh Circuit often says: “Where there is doubt in
the interpretation of state law, a federal court may certify the question to the state supreme
court to avoid making unnecessary Erie guesses and to offer the state court the opportunity to
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cases in the Eleventh Circuit where the court has taken the Lehman approach
to certification, there are very few published diversity-based certification
cases in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. While making conclusions about the
circumstances under which these circuits certify is therefore speculative at
best, the available case law suggests that they also take the Lehman approach
to certification.259
Similarly, while the Eighth Circuit also seems to take the Lehman
approach to certification,260 there are too few published cases in the Eighth
Circuit from which a definitive conclusion can be drawn. Nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit provides an interesting case study because, like the First
Circuit, it has explicitly distinguished certification from abstention in
diversity cases. In deciding whether to certify in Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson
Memorial Hospital,261 for example, the Eighth Circuit stated: “[T]he
Supreme Court has recognized that certification is not the drastic procedure
that the Court in Meredith . . . held abstention to be.”262 The Hatfield court
explained that a certification-based stay in the case at bar, in contrast to the
abstention-based dismissal in Meredith, “would not deprive [it] of
jurisdiction, nor would it force the parties into state court, but rather would
afford the parties a state forum for a state law question which process may
interpret or change existing law.” Tobin v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing multiple cases for the same proposition). For examples of Eleventh Circuit
cases in which the court takes the Lehman approach to certification and considers primarily
whether state law is unclear in deciding whether to certify, see, for example, id. (certifying
where the appeal “depend[ed] on resolution of questions of unsettled Florida law and [would]
affect many other cases”); Miller v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 678, 678 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Because there is no controlling Florida authority on this question, we certify this issue to the
Florida Supreme Court.”); Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.
2003) (certifying where there was “no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the
state’s highest court” and the “unanswered questions of state law” were “determinative of
[the] appeal”).
259. See, e.g., C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P., 306 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2002)
(certifying where state law uncertain); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d
370, 372 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[r]esort to the certification procedure is most
appropriate when the question is new and state law is unsettled” and declining to certify
because the pertinent case law was “relatively settled”); Langley v. Pierce, 993 F.2d 36, 37
(4th Cir. 1993) (certifying where there was “no controlling precedent in [state] law that
addresse[d] the exact controversy between the parties”).
260. See, e.g., Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 112 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir.
1997) (certifying where there was no “controlling precedent in the decisions of the Minnesota
Supreme Court which would enable [the] court to reach a sound decision without indulging in
speculation or conjecture”).
261. 701 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
262. Id. at 1268.
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obviate further extensive consideration by this court.”263 Furthermore, the
Eighth Circuit has said that while Meredith prevents federal courts from
declining to exercise their jurisdiction in diversity cases solely because state
law is difficult to determine, certification may solve the problem of
ascertaining unclear state law in such cases.264
Thus, in contrast to all of the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit has not
only differentiated between certification and abstention, but has attempted to
explain its rationale for doing so. Certification, unlike abstention, does not
require a federal court to surrender its jurisdiction or force the parties into
state court for a full round of litigation there. Instead, certification merely
permits a state’s highest court to decide a question of law.
V. WHY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS NEED NOT EMPLOY ABSTENTION
PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT THE CERTIFICATION OF STATE-LAW QUESTIONS IN
DIVERSITY CASES
A. Introduction
As Part IV demonstrates, many of the federal circuits essentially have
equated certification with abstention in diversity cases. While they recognize
that certification is procedurally distinct from abstention in that certification
does not require remitting the parties to state court for the start of another
lawsuit, they fail to recognize any substantive distinction between the two
doctrines and offer no explanation for their use of abstention principles to
determine whether they should certify.
Because the circuits do not explain their rationale for equating
certification with abstention in diversity cases, the reasons for this failure are
indeterminate. Nevertheless, several possibilities suggest themselves. First,
because certification and abstention are both devices for resolving unclear
issues of state law, it is possible that the circuits simply have inferred that
abstention principles should be used to determine whether certification is
263. Id. Interestingly, even though the Hatfield court distinguished certification from
abstention, the court still seemed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were present
in deciding whether to certify the question before it. Thus, the Hatfield court reasoned that
certification was appropriate not only because state law was unclear but also because “the
public policy aims involved in the statutes at issue [were] conflicting.” Id. at 1267. The court
also reasoned that certification was proper because a case involving the same statutes and
issues was before the state supreme court. Id. at 1268.
264. See Guillard v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20, 24-25 (8th Cir. 1973)
(remanding to the district court with directions to certify an unclear question of state law if
necessary).
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warranted. Second, given the Supreme Court’s relative silence regarding
certification in diversity cases,265 the circuits may have taken their cue from
the Supreme Court’s use and endorsement of certification in Pullman
abstention cases.266 Because the Supreme Court has suggested that
certification is proper in cases where Pullman abstention previously would
have been justified,267 the circuits may assume that certification in diversity
cases is proper only where the Court has approved abstention in diversity
cases. Finally, the circuits may reason that federal courts abdicate their duty
to exercise their jurisdiction when they certify in diversity cases.
Accordingly, the circuits may have concluded that certification (like
abstention) is warranted only where exceptional circumstances are present.
Regardless of the reasons for the circuits’ application of abstention
principles to certification issues, the question that has not been answered is
whether federal courts must employ abstention principles to limit the
certification of state-law questions in diversity cases. This Part argues that
they need not. First, this Part contends that the Supreme Court has never
limited certification in federal question or diversity cases to exceptional
circumstances, and therefore the lower courts are not compelled to do so.
Second, this Part maintains that the decision whether to certify should not
turn on the presence of exceptional circumstances because certification does
not result in abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. Instead, when a
federal court certifies a question of law to a state’s highest court, it merely
postpones the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, there is no reason for federal
courts to use the exceptional circumstances requirement of the abstention
doctrines to restrict the use of certification.
B. The Supreme Court has not Limited Certification to Exceptional
Circumstances in Federal Question Cases Involving State-Law Claims or
Diversity Cases
While there is no question that the majority of Supreme Court cases
addressing certification involve Pullman-type constitutional litigation and
unclear state law,268 the Court has never explicitly limited certification in
federal questions cases involving state-law claims to cases in which Pullman
abstention previously would have been appropriate. Indeed, the Arizonans
265.
266.
267.
(1997).
268.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76
See supra Part III.A.
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Court unambiguously distinguished certification from abstention when it
chided the Ninth Circuit for blending the two doctrines.269 Additionally, the
Arizonans Court suggested that unsettled questions of state law, and not
exceptional circumstances, are the only condition on certification.270 More
importantly, in Lehman, a diversity case, the Court approved of certification
where state law was unsettled but no exceptional circumstances were
present.271 In so doing, the Court implicitly recognized that certification in
diversity cases need not be limited by abstention principles.
Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished certification from abstention
in both the federal question and diversity contexts. Furthermore, in both
types of cases the Court has indicated that the only prerequisite for
certification is unclear state law. Consequently, the lower federal courts
should not regard Supreme Court precedent as permitting certification only
in exceptional circumstances.
C. Certification Need not be Limited to Exceptional Circumstances Because
Federal Courts Do not Abdicate Their Strict Duty to Exercise Their
Jurisdiction When They Certify
1. Abstention-Based Stays, Abdication of the Duty to Exercise
Jurisdiction, and the Exceptional Circumstances Requirement
The Supreme Court has said that when a federal court remands a
removed case to state court or dismisses a case outright on abstention
grounds, the court abdicates its strict duty to exercise its jurisdiction.272 Thus,
the Court has authorized abstention-based remands and dismissals only in
exceptional circumstances where considerations of federal-state comity
require deference to another sovereign.273 The Court also has said that when
a federal court stays its proceedings on abstention grounds in a diversity
case, it does not abdicate its strict duty to exercise its jurisdiction.274 Instead,
the federal court merely postpones the exercise of its jurisdiction until the
state courts resolve a question of state law involved in the case.275 Even
though the Court has opined that abstention-based stays do not result in the
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See supra Part III.A; Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B; Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
See supra Part II.A.; Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).
See supra Parts II.A-C.
See supra Part II.B.; Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.
See supra Part II.B.
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abdication of duty, however, the Court nevertheless has sanctioned
abstention-based stays, like abstention-based remands and dismissals, only in
exceptional circumstances.276
Because a federal court allegedly does not abdicate its duty when it
grants an abstention-based stay, there is no apparent reason that such stays
should be limited to exceptional circumstances in diversity cases. The Court
itself has offered no direct justification for this contradiction.277 One possible
explanation for the Court’s inconsistency, however, is that the Court
implicitly recognizes that an abstention-based stay in a diversity case is the
equivalent of an abstention-based remand or dismissal and effectively results
in a federal court’s abdication of its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.278
Therefore, because the consequences of abstention-based remands,
dismissals, and stays in diversity cases are the same, the Court has imposed
the exceptional circumstances requirement on abstention-based stays to limit
their use to those circumstances in which it has approved abstention-based
remands and dismissals. By doing so, the Court has ensured that the lower
courts are faithful to Meredith and do not abdicate their duty by granting
abstention-based stays simply because state law is difficult to ascertain or
unclear.279

276. See supra Parts II.B-C.
277. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1899 (noting the contradiction created by “the
Court’s distinction between the dismissal or remand of a federal action, which the Court
prohibits, and the stay of the action, which the Court suggests might be justified”).
278. Professors Richard Fallon, David Shapiro, and Daniel Meltzer recognize the
“functional similarity” between abstention-based stays and abstention-based remands and
dismissals in their casebook when they ask: “If the federal action is stayed pending resolution
of the state action, won’t the state court’s determination be dispositive of the federal action
under doctrines of claim and issue preclusion? If so, isn’t the practical effect of a stay identical
to that of an order dismissing the federal action?” Id. at 1900 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1193 (5th ed. 2003)); see also
Yelin, supra note 61, at 1899 (“If the distinction between a stay and a dismissal is to have
much significance, however, the Court will have to revise the application of the traditional
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion with regard to the claims remaining before the federal
court. Otherwise, the parties will be barred from relitigating the claim or any issues necessary
for deciding the claim in the federal court.”); id. at 1906 (“If the Court does not modify the
preclusive effect of the state court judgment, or if it gives the state proceedings only collateral
estoppel effect, then the federal court’s stay will be functionally indistinguishable from
dismissal since the effect of the stay ‘is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to
be litigated in a state forum.’” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 450 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1983))).
279. See supra Part II.A.
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The Court’s unwillingness to explicitly acknowledge the equivalency of
abstention-based remands, dismissals and stays in the diversity abstention
context can be attributed to the historic inability of courts to decline to
exercise their jurisdiction in actions at law.280 Because courts historically
lacked the discretionary power to dismiss damages actions, federal courts
today likewise cannot remand or dismiss actions for damages on abstention
grounds.281 If they do, they improperly abdicate their duty to exercise their
jurisdiction when it is properly invoked.282 In order to permit abstention in
damages actions, therefore, the Court necessarily reasoned in cases like
Thibodaux that a stay does not constitute abdication by a federal court of its
duty to decide the case before it.283 The Court concluded instead that a stay is
merely a postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction.284 By creating the
fiction that federal courts sitting in diversity merely delay the exercise of
their jurisdiction when they grant abstention-based stays, the Court was able
to justify extending abstention principles to actions at law. At the same time,
however, by limiting abstention-based stays to exceptional circumstances the
Court silently acknowledged that, for all practical purposes, federal courts
abdicate their jurisdiction when they grant abstention-based stays in diversity
cases.
While the Court has not openly recognized that abstention-based stays
are functionally equivalent to abstention-based remands and dismissals in its
major decisions approving or rejecting abstention, it has done so in the
context of deciding whether an abstention-based stay order is a “final order”
that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.285 Thus, in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,286 the Court held that an
abstention-based stay order was “final” for the purposes of § 1291 because it
put the plaintiff “‘effectively out of court’” and therefore “amount[ed] to a
dismissal of the suit.”287
In Moses H. Cone, a hospital and a construction company entered into a
contract which provided, in pertinent part, that certain disputes “could be

280. See supra Part II.B.
281. See supra Parts II.B-C.
282. See supra Parts II.B-C.
283. See supra Part II.B.
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) provides in pertinent part: “The courts of appeals . . .
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
286. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
287. Id. at 2, 10.
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submitted by either party to binding arbitration.”288 Eventually, the
construction company informed the hospital that it had claims for “delay and
impact costs.”289 The hospital then filed a declaratory judgment action in
state court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the company had no right to
arbitration under the contract.290 The company in turn filed suit in federal
district court under diversity jurisdiction “seeking an order compelling
arbitration.”291 Relying on Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, the district court stayed the federal action “pending resolution
of the state-court suit because the two suits involved the identical issue of the
arbitrability of [the company’s] claims.”292 The company then appealed the
district court’s stay order.293 The Fourth Circuit heard the case en banc and
“held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.”294 The Court of Appeals then reversed the stay order, remanded the
case to the district court, and instructed the district court to enter an
arbitration order.295
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court’s stay order
was a “final decision” and therefore was appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.296 The Court explained that because the federal and state suits involved
the same issue, the district court’s “stay of the federal suit pending resolution
of the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal
forum; the state court’s judgment on the issue would be res judicata.”297 The
Court reasoned that because “the sole purpose and effect of the stay [was]
precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court,” it was
functionally a dismissal.298 Thus, the district court’s stay order was final and
appealable.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id. at 6. Specifically, the company’s claims were “for extended overhead or
increase in construction costs due to delay or inaction by the [h]ospital.” Id.
290. Id. at 7.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 7-8.
294. Id. at 8.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 8-9.
297. Id. at 10.
298. Id. at 10 n.11 (“We hold . . . that a stay order is final when the sole purpose and
effect of the stay are precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.”); see
also id. at 28 (“[A] stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal.”).
The Moses H. Cone Court relied on its decision in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.
Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962), in reaching its conclusion that the stay order at issue was a
“final decision” for purposes of § 1291. Id. at 9. The Court explained that in Idlewild a district
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The Moses H. Cone Court made clear that its decision did not apply to
all stay orders but was limited “to cases where (under Colorado River,
abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all
or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum.”299 In
the course of its decision, the Moses H. Cone Court also rejected the
argument that an abstention-based stay is distinguishable from an abstentionbased dismissal because a stay can be re-opened by a party upon “a showing
that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights.”300 The Court said that
regardless of whether a case is dismissed or stayed on abstention grounds,
the federal courts would “remain open” to a party “who later demonstrated
the inadequacy of the state forum.”301 Thus, the fact that stayed proceedings
court “stayed [a] federal suit under the Pullman abstention doctrine.” Id. The Idlewild Court
“held that the District Court’s action was final and therefore reviewable by the Court of
Appeals.” Id. The Idlewild Court reasoned that the stay was final and therefore appealable
because it put the “[a]ppellant . . . effectively out of court.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Idlewild, 370 U.S. at 715 n.2). The Moses H. Cone Court said that “the
argument for finality of the District Court’s order [was] even clearer” in Moses H. Cone than
in Idlewild because “[a] district court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the
expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain
relief in state court on state-law grounds.” Id. at 9-10. In contrast, the stay order in Moses H.
Cone “meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; the state court’s
judgment on the issue would be res judicata.” Id.
The Court faced a similar issue in Quackenbush, where the defendant removed a
diversity case to federal court and the district court remanded the case to state court under
Burford. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 709-10 (1996). The Court held that
abstention-based remand orders are appealable as “final decisions” under § 1291 and, in the
process, affirmed Moses H. Cone. Id. at 712-15. The Court reasoned that the remand order
before it in Quackenbush was “in all relevant respects indistinguishable from the stay order
[it] found to be appealable in Moses H. Cone.” Id. at 714. Like the stay order in Moses H.
Cone, the remand order “put[] the litigants . . . ‘effectively out of court’ and its effect [was]
‘precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.’“ Id. (quoting Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 11 n.11). The Court noted that the remand order actually was “more ‘final’”
than the stay order because “[w]hen a district court remands a case to a state court, the district
court disassociates itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal
court’s docket.” Id. The Court concluded that “because the District Court’s remand order
[was] functionally indistinguishable from the stay order . . . in Moses H. Cone . . . it [was]
appealable.” Id. at 715.
Interestingly, however, “in discussing the merits of the remand, the majority simply
breezed by the persuasive demonstration in Moses H. Cone that an abstention-based stay did
not differ in substance from an abstention-based dismissal.” Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1900;
see supra note 122 (explaining the Quackenbush Court’s rationale for concluding that Burford
abstention was inappropriate on the facts of the case).
299. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11.
300. Id. at 27.
301. Id. at 28.
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can be reopened did not demonstrate “any genuine difference between a stay
and a dismissal.”302
The abstention-based stay granted by the district court in Thibodaux is
very similar to the stay in Moses H. Cone, and like the stay in Moses H.
Cone, it was functionally a dismissal. In Thibodaux, the plaintiff sued to
appropriate property from the defendant under a state eminent domain
statute.303 The defendant removed the case to federal court under diversity
jurisdiction and sought compensation for the taking.304 The district court
stayed the federal proceedings and remitted the parties to state court to obtain
an authoritative answer to the question of whether the statute permitted the
taking at issue.305 In upholding the stay, the Thibodaux Court emphasized
that the district court had merely postponed the exercise of its jurisdiction.306
To shore up this contention, the Court said that if the state courts found that
the taking was permitted, then the parties would return to federal court for a
determination of damages.307 In addition, the Court noted that if the parties
did not file suit in state court in a timely fashion, the district court could
assert its jurisdiction and decide the case itself.308
Like the two cases in Moses H. Cone, the federal and state cases in
Thibodaux involved the same issue: whether the state eminent domain statute
at issue permitted the taking. As in Moses H. Cone, once the state courts
resolved the statutory interpretation in Thibodaux, there would be no further
litigation on that issue in the federal court because the state court’s judgment
on the issue would be res judicata. If the state courts found that the taking
was not permitted, the federal case would be over. Even if the state courts
found that the taking was permitted and the parties returned to federal court,
however, the only task left for the federal court would be to award
compensation. Thus, the object of the stay in Thibodaux was to require an
essential part of the case to be litigated in state court. 309 Moreover, like the
302. Id.
303. See supra Part II.B.; La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
26 (1959).
304. See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 25.
305. See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26.
306. See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.
307. See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
308. See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29 (majority opinion).
309. As one commentator has explained:
In [diversity cases] . . . a federal court’s decision to stay federal proceedings to permit
adjudication of the case in state court will have virtually the same effect as a
dismissal. Even if the state proceeding is limited to a declaratory judgment action,
there may be little or nothing left for the federal court to do after the state court
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effect of the Moses H. Cone stay, the effect of the Thibodaux stay was to
abdicate jurisdiction of a federal case to state court. While the Thibodaux
Court stressed that the stay was simply a postponement of jurisdiction, it
was, like the stay in Moses H. Cone, functionally a dismissal.310 The
Thibodaux defendant, as much as the Moses H. Cone plaintiff, was
effectively out of federal court.
Because the stay in Thibodaux was functionally a dismissal, the Court’s
statement in Thibodaux that the district court postponed its jurisdiction when
it granted the stay (and the Court’s later statements in Quackenbush to the
same effect)311 are, at a minimum, suspect. It is more likely that the Court
recognized that the stay in Thibodaux was, for all intents and purposes, a
dismissal, but also understood that an abstention-based remand was not
possible in a diversity action for damages. To avoid the improper abdication
of the duty to exercise jurisdiction and, at the same time, allow for deference
to another sovereign where necessary, the Thibodaux and Quackenbush
Courts thus approved of abstention-based stays in diversity cases only where
exceptional circumstances are present.

renders its judgment. If the state court resolves a state-law claim against the plaintiff
or a state-law defense in favor of the defendant, then the federal court need only
dismiss the case or perhaps enter judgment in favor of the defendant. If, on the other
hand, the state court rules in favor of the plaintiff, then the federal court is at most
required to consider the appropriate remedy.
Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1528-29 (1997).
310. The ability of the district court in Thibodaux to lift the stay and adjudicate the
case if necessary, like the ability of a party to reopen a stay in Moses H. Cone, does not
demonstrate that there is a difference between a stay and a dismissal in this context.
311. See supra Part II.B; see also Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1899 (discussing the
“practical effect” of a stay in cases like Quackenbush). As Professor Meltzer has explained:
In a case like Quackenbush, the practical effect of a stay may be not merely to
postpone, but to permanently prevent, the federal court litigation. For even if the
plaintiff re-filed a state court action, the defendant could remove that action too and
presumably have it stayed as well. Even where a stay might permit a litigant to re-file
successfully in state court without facing the prospect of removal—as might be true
where the only basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity and the suit is against an instate defendant—the stay’s effect is likely to be no different in the end than that of a
dismissal.
Id. at 1899-1900.
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2. Certification-Based Stays, Postponement of the Exercise of
Jurisdiction, and the Exceptional Circumstances Requirement
In contrast to abstention-based stays, certification-based stays need not
be based on exceptional circumstances because a federal court does not
abdicate its duty to exercise its jurisdiction when it certifies. Certificationbased stays, unlike abstention-based stays, actually result in the
postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction rather than the surrender of
jurisdiction to a state court.
When a federal court grants an abstention-based stay, it remits the parties
to state court for a full round of litigation there. The parties begin in a state
trial court and must pursue the litigation as far as possible in state court.
Consequently, abstention-based stays “require federal courts to relinquish all
three functions” that they “perform when they adjudicate cases: law
declaration, fact identification, and law application.”312 In other words, a
federal court abdicates its duty to exercise its jurisdiction when it grants an
abstention-based stay.
On the contrary, when a federal court grants a certification-based stay, it
asks the highest court of a state to answer a question of state law. When the
state’s high court answers the question, it returns the case to the federal
court. The federal court then lifts the stay and adjudicates the controversy
before it. Certification, therefore,
generally requires federal courts to cede only one . . . function[]—law
declaration. Federal courts remain free to undertake necessary fact
identification both before and after certification, and to apply relevant
principles of state law to the facts once the highest state court has supplied
313
the necessary rules of decision.

312. Clark, supra note 309, at 1551; see Smith, supra note 128, at 657 (when a federal
court abstains, it “severs itself from the case, leaving the state to make an independent
determination of the state law issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
313. Clark, supra note 309, at 1551; see Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp., 701
F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating “that certification is not the drastic procedure that the
Court in Meredith . . . held abstention to be” and reasoning that “certification would not
deprive [it] of jurisdiction, []or . . . force the parties into state court, but rather would afford
the parties a state forum for a state law question which process may obviate further extensive
consideration”); see also England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964)
(discussing, in the Pullman abstention context, “the benefit of a federal trial court’s role in
constructing a record and making fact findings” and explaining that “[h]ow the facts are found
will often dictate the decision of federal claims”).
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Thus, certification “enables the federal court to ‘participate[] in the
resolution of the entire case by framing the state law questions [and]
specifying relevant facts and legal issues.’”314 In other words, when a federal
court certifies it delays the exercise of its jurisdiction, but it does not abdicate
its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.
In Lehman Brothers v. Schein, the only diversity case where the Supreme
Court has addressed certification, the Court itself indicated that certificationbased stays need not be limited to exceptional circumstances because they do
not involve the abdication of duty.315 The Lehman Court remanded a case to
the court of appeals for consideration of whether certification was
appropriate given the novelty of the issue and the unsettled state of Florida
law.316 The case involved a run-of-the-mill shareholder’s derivative suit and
there was no suggestion that exceptional circumstances were present.317 In
reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it had reversed an abstentionbased dismissal in Meredith on facts very similar to those in Lehman.318 The
Lehman Court explained that, under Meredith, “the mere difficulty in
ascertaining [state] law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state
tribunal for the start of another lawsuit.”319 The problem in Meredith, of
course, was that the lower court abdicated its duty to exercise its jurisdiction
by sending the parties to state court for a new lawsuit absent exceptional
circumstances.320 The Lehman Court seemed to suggest, however, that
ascertaining state law through certification, despite the absence of
exceptional circumstances, is not problematic because the federal court is
merely postponing the exercise of its jurisdiction rather than abdicating its
duty altogether.321
Finally, Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Lehman lends further support
to the argument that certification-based stays constitute a postponement of
314. Smith, supra note 128, at 657 (quoting John A. Scanelli, Note, The Case for
Certification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 641 (1971)); see also Levin, supra note 10, at
350 (“[B]y abstaining, a federal court temporarily—if it has stayed the action . . . severs itself
from the case, leaving the state court to make an independent determination of at least the
state law issue. . . . In inter-jurisdictional certification, however, the federal court actively
participates in the resolution of the entire case by framing the state law question, specifying
relevant facts and legal issues, and certifying directly to the state’s highest court.”).
315. See supra Part III.B.
316. See supra Part III.B.; Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
317. See supra Part III.B.
318. See supra Part III.B.
319. Lehman, 416 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
320. See supra Part III.B.
321. See supra Part III.B.
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the jurisdictional duty rather than its abdication. Rehnquist concurred in
Lehman in order “to emphasize the scope of the discretion of federal judges
in deciding whether to use . . . certification procedures.”322 He first explained
that cases like Meredith and Thibodaux “deal[] with the issue of how to
reconcile the exercise of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon
the federal courts with the important considerations of comity and
cooperative federalism which are inherent in a federal system.”323 Rehnquist
placed certification, however, “[a]t the other end of the spectrum.”324 He
suggested that the decision whether to certify, unlike the decision whether to
abstain, does not involve deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist
such that the abdication of duty is warranted.325 Instead, Rehnquist compared
the use of certification by a federal court in a diversity case to “researching a
point of state law” and described it as simply part of the “decisionmaking
process.”326
Justice Rehnquist’s language in his Lehman concurrence certainly
suggests that he did not view certification-based stays as involving the
surrender of jurisdiction to a state court and the abdication of the duty to
exercise jurisdiction. On the contrary, Rehnquist’s language indicates that he
viewed the decision whether to certify as one step out of many that a federal
court takes in adjudicating a controversy. This in turn implies that Rehnquist
saw certification for what it is: a postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction
that need not be based on exceptional circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over ten years ago a federal judge wrote: “Federal courts evince no clear
understanding of when, how, or even why to certify . . . .”327 This Article has
attempted to demonstrate that the federal circuit courts remained confused
about the appropriate use of certification in diversity cases. More
specifically, this Article has argued that several of the federal circuits
mistakenly equate certification with abstention in diversity cases because
322. Lehman, 415 U.S. at 392 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 393-94.
324. Id. at 394.
325. Id. (“[I]n a purely diversity case such as this one, the use of such a procedure is
more a question of the considerable discretion of the federal court in going about the
decisionmaking process than it is a question of a choice trenching upon the fundamentals of
our federal-state jurisprudence.”).
326. Id.
327. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 677, 691 (1995).
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they incorrectly view certification as an abdication rather than a
postponement of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. These circuits focus on
whether state law is unclear and whether there are exceptional circumstances
that warrant certification.
Instead of focusing on exceptional circumstances, however, the federal
courts should consider turning their full attention to other factors that are
highly relevant to the certification decision. For example, certification, like
abstention, results in costs to both the federal and state court systems and the
litigants in terms of both delay and expense. More importantly, a federal
court’s decision not to certify when state law is unsettled raises the Erie328
specter of both forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws.
While the circuits do sometimes consider factors such as these in deciding
whether to certify, they do so very inconsistently.329 Indeed, it is impossible
to identify the precise circumstances under which a federal court will
consider factors other than the clarity of state law and the presence of
exceptional circumstances.
It is a “bedrock fact” that only a state’s highest court “can render an
authoritative interpretation of that sovereign’s laws.”330 Given this fact,
federal courts can cause multiple problems when they unnecessarily decide
questions of state law.331 Thus, the federal courts should stop needlessly
limiting certification in diversity cases and at least begin the process of
clarifying when, how and why certification is appropriate.

328. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-77 (1938). The Supreme Court has
identified the prevention of forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws as
the “twin aims of the Erie rule.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
329. The factors that the circuits sometimes consider are: (1) whether the issue is or
may be dispositive; (2) the likely recurrence of the issue; (3) the timing of the request for
certification; (4) whether the party requesting certification chose the federal forum; and, from
time to time, (5) whether the denial of certification will lead to forum shopping or inequitable
administration of the laws. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal
Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 249-55 (2005-2006) (discussing criticisms of certification);
Clark, supra note 309, at 1556-63 (discussing some of these factors).
330. Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1237-38 (2004).
331. Id. at 1238 (describing the problems that federal courts can cause when they
decide questions of state law, including forum shopping and inequitable administration of the
law).

